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Book Review 
Harmful Tax Competition and its Harmful Remedies 
TAX CoMPETITION IN EuROPE. EDITED BY WoLFGANG SCI-I()N. (Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands: IBFD Publications BV, 2003) 518 pages. €135. 
TAx CoMPETITION AND EU LAw. BY CARLO PINTO. (The Hague, the Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003) 437 pages. £109.00. 
THERE is, among some of your reviewer's friends, an abhorrence of tax competition, and 
a fascination with tax harmonization, that defies simple understanding. The way that the 
case is typically presented, European tax harmonization is desirable because eliminating 
tax differences between European nations would promote economic efficiency. With 
greater economic efficiency, there is more of everything to go around, so it becomes 
possible to maintain life exactly as it currently is, except that now, instead of every family 
having one toaster, they can have two. 
A wise goal, a worthy goal, this economic efficiency-though the drive to eke more out 
of existing resources in order to give every household that second toaster hardly seems the 
stuff of vicious and prolonged political controversy. Since the potential output benefits of 
European tax harmonization, if they are positive at all, are likely to be very small, perhaps 
this is not, ultimately, an argument about the kind of efficiency you can get when a firm 
slightly contracts its German operation in order to expand slightly its Italian operation. 
Quite possibly this is, in fact, an argument about the future of European society-about 
whether, and how, to sustain government expenditures at the levels to which they grew 
in the late twentieth century. Economic efficiency is just intellectual cover for what the 
fight really concerns, which is the cost and desirability of the modern welfare state. 
Is there a necessary connection between tax competition and the level of government 
expenditures? Probably not, since modern governments raise most of their revenue from 
sources that are not subject to significant competitive pressures. The antagonists, for some 
reason, have a hard time hearing that message. For the rest of us, who do not want to 
fight, but merely to understand, an evaluation of the underlying law and economics holds 
the prospect of sharpening our appreciation of these issues. Hence these recent books by 
Wolfgang Schon and Carlo Pinto are welcome arrivals. 
Everyone knows the simple textbook case in favour of tax harmonization, one that 
starts from imagining a world consisting of two countries, identical in all respects other 
than their corporate tax rates. In this world, the country with the lower corporate tax rate 
receives greater corporate investment, coming from both domestic and foreign sources. 
This is inefficient, in the sense that the two countries would produce greater aggregate 
output if corporate capital were instead allocated evenly between them. 
This story is nice, but the question is whether it has anything to say about tax 
competition. Countries are obviously not identical-and if they were, wouldn't they then 
adopt identical tax policies, eliminating any problem associated with differences? 
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The point, more broadly, is that purposeful tax policies reflect local conditions, and 
tax rates differ because local conditions differ. There is no theory of optimal tax policy 
design that says that different countries should choose the same tax policies, that they 
should coordinate, say, on a corporate tax rate of 30 per cent. Far from it: the efficient 
rate of taxation depends on supply and demand conditions, the degree to which taxation 
discourages taxed activities. Since these differ everywhere, it will generally make sense 
for one country to have a higher petroleum tax while a different country raises the same 
revenue with a higher top individual income tax rate. In fact, the modern theory of optimal 
taxation carries only one harmonizing implication, which is that it is always more efficient 
to tax consumption or labour income rather than capital income, since the intertemporal 
consumption distortions induced by capital income taxes compound over time, creating 
huge inefficiencies, the cost of which is generally borne by labor. Hence all governments, 
even those acting only in the interest oflocal workers, have incentives to impose zero rates 
of tax on capital income. If governments act rationally in response to these incentives then 
capital tax rates would be harmonized at zer(}--but this is rather not what the harmonizers 
have in mind. 
What is it, then, that sensible tax harmonization advocates are thinking? For that we 
now have these two books. 
Wolfgang Schon edited Tax Competition in Europe, and wrote the very thoughtful 
summary chapter that opens the volume. His summary chapter walks a fine line, laying 
out many of the pros and cons of tax harmonization, not directly advocating any policies, 
all the while subtly tilting the intellectual playing field in support of European efforts 
to limit "harmful" competition. SchOn struggles with how to distinguish acceptable tax 
competition from "harmful" competition, a problem he shares with other contributors to 
the volume, and indeed, all who feel there is an important distinction between the two. 
What is the case for a harmonized high rate of capital taxation among European nations 
with significantly different economies? Schon sees two primary benefits of harmonization, 
first that it promotes efficient resource allocation, and second that tax harmonization 
counters market forces that put downward pressure on tax rates and tax bases. He is 
skeptical of the standard microeconomic case for tax competition (p.2): 
"\Vhen we read mainstream US economic literature about the advantages of tax 
competition we have to bear in mind that in the United States both the labour 
market and the financial market are fully integrated, with high mobility for all 
production factors. Contrary to this, in Europe we have to distinguish between a 
highly integrated financial market, a pretty advanced market for goods and services 
and a labour market that still faces many non-legal impediments such as the different 
languages or cultural backgrounds of European citizens." 
Unfortunately, the book does not develop this point further, so that, by the end, it 
is anything but clear how the European-American differences cut. If tax competition is 
good for the United States, with its high rate of economic growth, low unemployment 
rate, and rather free markets, does it follow that tax competition is bad for the much 
more regulated European economies? Isn't it possible that tax competition would benefit 
European economies by permitting countries to tailor their tax systems to local needs 
and circumstances, in the process providing a force that mitigates against some of the 
institutional constraints that prevent economies from achieving their potential? There 
is a presumption in much of the Schon volume, made explicit by the Pinto book, that 
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tax competition, in reducing capital taxes, leads to high labour income taxes and thereby 
contributes to the European unemployment problem. 
Is that right? Do lower capital taxes and higher labour taxes lead to greater 
unemployment? Economic theory says otherwise: lower capital taxes encourage saving and 
investment, which improves labour productivity and increases wages, thereby working 
against the regulatory and expectational rigidities that cause unemployment. This is more 
than an academic curiosum: decades ago Ireland slashed its taxes on foreign investment 
to the subsequent enormous benefit of its labour market. The Irish problem, from the 
standpoint of those who would like to maintain high capital tax rates, is that now other 
European countries are thinking that maybe they too would like to enjoy some prosperity. 
The Schon chapter is followed by a spirited and cogent defense of tax competition by 
Alain Steichen. Steichen argues that tax competition disciplines governments otherwise 
inclined to overtax capital income, and he worries--clearly, he is distraught-that 
contemporary Europe displays an insufficient degree of tax competition. A short chapter 
by Augusto Fantozzi considers the application of state aid rules to tax competition issues, 
expressing considerable skepticism about the actions of the European Commission in 
promoting tax harmonization in the absence of explicit legal mandate to do so. Matthias 
Mors counters with his own chapter defending the Commission and what he describes 
(p.l51) as its "fairly prudent approach, leaving Member States' prerogatives in defining 
their tax systems and tax rates largely intact." This chapter leaves the reader in no doubt 
whatsoever that, on some future day when the restraints of prudence are lifted, some in 
Brussels will try to orchestrate European tax policy. 
This is stuff to stir adrenaline, so an unwary reader who starts the book in the 
early evening might have trouble falling asleep later on. Fortunately, the remaining 366 
pages consist of 16 dreary chapters reporting on the tax systems of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The chapters are presented 
in alphabetical order of country names, and, while they have separate authors, they have 
virtually (in some cases, exactiy) identical structures, section headers, and content. This 
part of the book may have been intended to give the reader a taste of what life would offer 
in a more harmonized Europe. A couple of the chapters, notably including that by Ian 
Roxan on the UK, break from this mould, and perhaps more would have done but for the 
apparent agreement not to compete for the reader's interest. 
Carlo Pinto's Tax Competition and EU Larv is a treatise rather than a contributed 
collection; its provocative arguments are tightly wrapped around central themes, so the 
book seems considerably shorter than its 437 pages. Pinto is unabashedly opposed to 
"harmful" tax competition, with which he associates the erosion of the welfare state, 
high unemployment rates, skewed distributions of income, unfair reallocation of tax 
base between countries, and other maladies. The problem, we are told (p.l2), is that 
"national jurisdictions outbidding each other surrender themselves to the market." This, 
by implication, is bad. 
Lest one be tempted to despair (your reviewer was not), Pinto has a solution, which is 
a pan-European agreement to avoid "harmful" tax competition. The art in the proposal 
lies in its definition of "harmful" competition. A country's tax practices are "harmful" if 
they meet two tests, the first of which is that they offer tax reductions that are targeted 
to specific activities or industries. The second test is that tax provisions are designed not 
to encourage domestic industries but instead to steal activities or tax base from other 
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countries. Put these two together, and you have harmful tax competition, something that 
Pinto would have European countries agree to abolish. 
In a nod to reality, Pinto acknowledges the difficulty of actually enforcing such 
an agreement. Every tax system in the world favours some industries or activities, and 
identifying tax provisions designed to poach tax base from other countries is a challenging, 
if not impossible, task. To be sure, there is little danger that European governments will 
actually embrace this proposal, but as a device to prompt thinking about the consequences 
of tax competition, the proposal is excellent. 
Abstracting from the specifics, tax competition is "harmful" in Pinto's framework when 
it impedes the ability of countries to pursue policies that they would adopt in the absence 
of competition. Should this be a cause of concern? Or does having vital and progressive 
public policies entail being willing to modify the compromises of the past in the light of 
changing conditions? Using this standard it is not hard to name dozens of policies that 
countries would do well to jettison, and if, over time, competition has this effect, then 
hooray for competition. 
The Schon and Pinto books share certain features. Both went to press a couple of 
years ago, prior to the discovery by the European Court of Justice of what fun it is to 
wreak havoc on national tax systems, so aspects of the institutional setting have since 
changed significantly. Both books have what might be called a European focus. There is 
no discussion of tax considerations in the US, Japan, Canada, China, India, Brazil and 
other countries, and certainly no serious proposal that these places be drawn into any 
European agreement to limit tax competition. Under what circumstances would there be 
benefits from limiting competition within Europe when most of the world economy is 
free to compete with abandon? Are there any such circumstances? 
There is something just a little bit sad about the case for European tax harmonization as 
it appears in these books. The desire to harmonize taxes stems from a deep concern that 
the increasingly competitive world is changing Europe. In order to forestall this, in order 
to keep things as they have been, the advocates urge policymakers to ignore the rest of 
the world and forge binding agreements among Europeans. This is yesterday's method of 
preserving yesterday's policies. The world of tomorrows offers unprecedented economic 
opportunities to those who are open to them, and it will be a great shame if Europe is not 
included. 
]AMES R. HINES JR* 
• University of Michigan and NBER. 
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